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IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICII~iOND. 
Record No. 1658 
HENRY P. FRIEDMAN, Plaintiff in Error, 
versus 
WILLIAM JORDAN, AN INFANT, BY RICHARDS. 
BARRON, HIS NEXT FRIE:ND, 
Defendant in Error. 
To the Honorable Justices of the· supreme Court of Appeals 
of Virginia: 
Your petitioner, Henry P. Friedman, respectfully repre-
sents that he is aggrieved by a final judgment of the Court 
of Law and Chancery of the City of Norfolk, Virginia, ren-
dered against him on the 26th day of January, 1935, in favor 
of William Jordan, an infant, for the sum of $1,500.00, with 
legal interest thereon from the said 26th day of January, 
1935, until paid, together with the costs, in an action pending 
in said court wherein the said William Jordan was plaintiff, 
and your petitioner was defendant. ' .. 
We will hereinafter refer to the said William Jordan. as 
the plaintiff, and to your Retiti.oner as the defendant, in ae:. 
cordance with their respective positions in the lower court . · -
A transcript of the record, with the exhibits, is herewith 
filed, to which reference is made. 
This petition is adopted as the opening brief for your pe-
titioner, a copy of which was delivered to counsel for the 
plaintiff on the 4th day of April, 1935. Oral argument of 
this petition is requested. 
2 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
FACTS. 
At the time the plaintiff was injured, as hereinafter men-
tioned, the defendant operated a small grocery store on 35th 
Street, in the City of Norfolk. Up to the morning of the 
day on which the plaintiff was injured, the plaintiff, an eigh-
teen year old colored boy, had worked for the defendant as 
a delivery boy for about two weeks, at a salary of $5.00 per 
week. On the morning of tTune 14th, 1934, the defendant left 
his store at about 7 :30 o'clock and returned at about 8 :30 or 
9 :00 o'clock. He left his sister-in-law in charge of the store 
while he was gone. During the defendant's absence, the 
plaintiff had been sent out to deliver groceries. When the 
plaintiff returned from his said deliveries, and before the 
defendant returned that morning, the plaintiff left the de-
fendant's service. The plaintiff had collected on the gro-
ceries delivered by him for the defendant the sum of $1.25, 
which he did not turn over to the defendant before he quit 
work. The plaintiff also had with him a book which 'vas 
fo be signed by customers to whom merchandise was deliv-
ered on credit, so that the defendant would have a record of 
what was due him from such customers. 
Upon the defendant's return to the store that morning at 
8:30 or 9:00 o'clock, he learned from his sister-in-law that 
the plaintiff had quit. The defendant also ascertained that 
the plaintiff had gone to work for a competitor a few doors 
from the defendant's place of business. Whereupon, the de-
fendant sent an employee of l1is, a :\fr. Sawyer, to see if he 
could get the aforementioned book back from the plaintiff, 
but Sawyer was unable to see the plaintiff or get the book 
from him. 
The book which the plaintiff carried with him included the 
signature of a Mrs. Morschell, who had purchased groceries 
on credit that morning and signed therefor in said book. Said 
book was valuable to the defendant because it was the only 
record he had of showing what was due him from the v~rious 
customers who signed therein for merchandise they pur-
chased on credit. Th~ defendant thought possibly said book 
might have been left inadvertently by the plaintiff at Mrs. 
Morschell 's house, because on previous occasions such books 
had been left by various delivery boys inadvertently with the 
customers. So the defendant decided that he would ride to 
Mrs. J\forschell 's house to see if possibly the book was not 
left there. In order to get to ~Irs. l\Iorschell 's house, he had 
to drive northwardly along Newport A.venue and pass its in-
tersection with Georgia Avenue, the intersection at which 
the injury hereinafter complained of occurred. 
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The defendant testified that while on his way to Mrs. Mor-
schell 's house, he saw the plaintiff and another colored boy 
by the name of Watford, both of whom 'vere then working 
for the same employer, standing on the sidewalk on Newport 
A venue talking, each one with a bicycle and .basket thereon; 
that he drove up Newport Avenue opposite to the place where 
the plaintiff and Watford were standing talking, stopped his 
automobile and asked the plaintiff for the book; that because 
Newport Avenue is a busy thoroughfare,. he did _not want to 
park there while carrying on a conversation ·with the plain-
tiff relative to the book, so he decided to make a. right-hand 
turn into Georgia A venue, park there and find out from the 
plaintiff what he did with the book; that he drove up a little 
way and as he was turning into Georgia Avenue in ~econd 
gear, the plaintiff, who had then gotten on his bicycle and 
riding the same on the sidewalk, also made a right-hand turn 
into Georgia Avenue, ran off the sidewalk ov.er the curb onto 
Georgia Avenue in front of his car; that as the plaintiff 
came over the curb, his heavy basket load of groceries must 
have caused him to lose control and he fell in front of the 
defendant's car; that the defendant stopped as quickly as 
he could, but the front part of his car struck the pedal of 
the bicycle at a point not over four or five feet from the in-
tersection of Georgia and Newport Avenues; that no part 
of his car ran over the plaintiff or the bicycle; that the plain-
tiff was lying under the bicycle, which was hung up under 
the bumper of the defendant's car; that he wanted to take 
the plaintiff to the hospital in his own car, but some colored 
man would not let him do it; that he sent his doctor to see 
the plaintiff several times, not because he felt that he was 
to blame for the accident, but because the plaintiff was in-
jured as a result of the collision the defendant had with him; 
that at the time the plaintiff quit work, the defendant was 
indebted to him in the sum· of $2.50, for one-half week's 
salary. 
On the other hand, the plaintiff testified that on the morn-
ing of the day on which he was injured, he had returned to 
the store at about 8:30 o'clock with the $1.25 he had collected 
on C. 0. D. orders, and the aforementioned book, which he 
placed on top of the cash register; that the defendant told 
him he did not like the way he was using his bicycle and dis-
charged him; that he asked the defendant when he was going 
to pay him for his work, ·and the defendant told him t~ come 
back that night: that he refused to give the defendant the 
$1.25 which he had collected until the defendant paid him 
what he owed him for his work; that he found temporary em-
ployment at a grocery store several doors down from the ·de-
4 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia .. 
fendant 's place of business; that he 'vas sent out to deliver 
some· groceries on.a bicycle about an hour later with William 
Watford, who was working for the same employer; that when 
they rode by the defendant's store, the latter ran out of his 
store and hollered at him about his money; that he did not 
see the defendant again until about a half hour later, when he 
and Watford were riding northwardly along Newport Ave-
nue, fifty or sixty yards south of its intersection with Geor-
gia .!.venue; that he was riding along in the street and heard 
a car coming up behind him; that he looked back and saw 
· the defendant in his car; that he then rode as fast as he 
could northwardly along Newport A ~enue and could hear the 
defendant coming behind him; that he kept close to the curb 
in the street and was never on the sidewalk; that when he 
got to the corner of Newport and Georgia Avenues, he turned 
sharply to the right into Georgia A venue; that the defend-
ant _followed right behind him, and before he had gotten 
twenty or thirty feet down Georgia A venue close to the right-
hand curb, the defendant ran into him; that he did not know 
just what part of the car hit him, and all he remembered 
was that he fell over his bicycle under the front of the car; 
that the next thing he remembered was th_at his legs and hips 
were all- tangled up in the bicycle under the middle of the de-
fendant's car, which was pointing toward the right-hand 
curbstone about twenty feet from the corner he had turned; 
that his head and shoulders were sticking out from under the 
car about midway of the running board on the right side; 
that the defendant was _standing near him shouting ''give 
me my money''; that the defendant put his hands in his 
pockets and looked around under the car. · 
William Watford practically corroborated the plainti-ff:. 
William Watford and the plaintiff denied that they were 
standing on the sidewalk talking when ·the defendant ap-
proached them on Newport A venue. 
A Mr. J. E. McCraw testified that he lived on the north-
west corner of Newport and Georgia Avenues, diagonally op-
posite the ~orner at which the collision occurred; that he was 
sitting on the front porch reading a newspaper, and his at-
tention was attracted, by the noise of an automobile on the 
street, although automobiles ran up and down Newport Ave~ 
nne very frequently; that he looked up and saw the defend-
ant's automobile proceeding northwardly along · Newport 
A venue about twenty or thirty yards south of its intersection 
with Georgia A venue ; that about eight or ten :feet in front 
of· the defendant, he saw the plaintiff riding a bicycle with 
a grocery basket on it; that the plaintiff's bicycle and the 
defendant's car were close to the curb; that it looked like 
Henry P. Friedman v. Wm. Jordan, etc. 5 
the defendant was chasing the plaintiff; that the plaintiff 
turned sharply into Georgia A venue and the def-endant's car 
turned in directly behind him without slowing down; that he· 
heard a collision, and the car slowed down and stopped; that 
he went to the corner to see what happened; that the front 
wheels of the car were about fifteen feet from the corner, and 
the car was pointing in towards the curb on the right-hand 
side of Georgia Avenue; that the plaintiff was lying with his 
legs a~d hips directly under the middle of the car; that the 
plaintiff was hung up under the car and his feet seemed to be 
hung up in it; that he did not see any other colored boy rid-
ing a bicycle with the plaintiff. 
F. H. Jones and C. 1\L Wilder both testified that they were 
painting a house nearby; that they heard the noise of ·a col-
lision and came to the place of the accident; that the defend-
ant's automobile was five or six feet from the corner and 
pointed in towards the right-hand side of the street. 
The testimony of Dr. R. D. Glasser, the only physician who 
treated the plaintiff, was that he visited the latter three times, 
after whieh he discontinued his visits because he did not feel 
that the plaintiff's condition required any further treatment; 
that the plaintiff sustained no permanent injuries, but was 
cut and bruised about the legs, shoulders and body. 
Dr. Southgate Leigh, Jr., testified that a week before the 
trial, at the request of plaintiff's counsel, he examined the 
plaintiff merely for the purpose of enabling him to testify 
at the trial as to the nature of the plaintiff's injuries; that 
the plaintiff had no permanent injuries, but had a definite 
sore spot on the top of his rigl1t shoulder which might pre-· 
vent him from raising his arm up high or lifting heavy ob-
jects because of the pain; that the plaintiff's legs just above 
the knees were bad.Iy scarred . 
. The plaintiff and his stepfather, Blunt, testified that from 
the time the plaintiff was injured up until the date of the 
trial, a period from June 14th, 1934, to January, 3rd, 1935, 
the plaintiff was unable to do any work and did not worl\:. 
On the morning of the trial of this case, before the jury< 
was sworn, counsel for the plaintiff obtained leave from the 
court to amend the notice of motion for judgment originally 
filed by the plaintiff, which was amended in the manner set 
_ out in Certificate of Exception No. 6 (R., pp. 24, 25, 26, 27). 
By that amendment, the allegation in the original notice of 
motion for judgment that Jordan was ''standing'' on New-
port A venue was changed so as to make it read that he was 
"riding·" on Newport Avenue, and the allegation in the origi-
nal notice of motion for judgment that he thereupon got upon 
6 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
his bicycle and rode northwardly along Newport Avenue (R., 
p. 25) was scratched out. 
At the trial of this case, the court gave the following in-
struction at the request of the plaintiff, which is assigned as 
one of the errors, to-wit: 
''The Court instructs the jury that if they find for the 
plaintiff, they must consider in fixing the damages to which 
he is entitled his physical injury and suffering, and if they 
also believe, from the evidence, that the plaintiff's injury re-
sulted from wilfulness or maliciousness on the part of the 
defendant, they- may award the plaintiff in addition to the 
damages above mentioned such further sums as will, in their 
opinion, constitute proper punishment and proper warning 
against the commission of such wrongs.'' 
The defendant objected to the granting of the afore-men-
tioned instruction because there was no evidence to support 
any contention that the defendant wilfully and maliciously 
injured the plaintiff, but the court overruled the defendant's 
objection to the granting of said instruction. 
The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff against the 
defendant in the following words: 
''We the jury find for the plaintiff in the sum of $1,500.00, 
believing it was the result wilful and malicious negligence.'' 
Whereupon, the defendant moved the court to set aside the 
verdict of the jury and grant him a new trial on the first three 
grounds alleged in Certificate of Exception No.4 (R., p. 23), 
which motion was set down for argument for a later date. 
Before the argument on the motion of a new trial, the de-
fendant asserted another ground for setting aside the verdict 
of the jury, namely, that of after-discovered evidence, ano 
in support of said additional ground, filed his affidavit and 
the affidavit of one Bernard Baker, showing that the plain-
tiff had worked for a period of about five weeks beginning in 
September, 1934, which was a part of the time the plaintiff 
testified he was unable to work. Said affidavits have been 
authenticated by the Trial Judge and are made a part of the 
;record in this case. The trial court overruled the defend-
ant's motion and entered a final judg1ncnt against him, to 
which action ·of the court the said defendant duly excepted. 
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ARGUMENT. 
The errors assigned are: 
1. That the verdict was eontrary to law and the evidence. 
2. That the verdict was excessive. 
3. That the court granted an improper instruction for the 
plaintiff over the defendant's objection .. 
4. That the court erred in not granting the defendant a 
new trial on the ground of after-discovered evidence. 
We will treat the aforementioned assignments of error in 
the order in which they are above ·set out. 
1. THE COURT SHOULD HA. VE SET ASIDE THE 
VERDICT OF THE JURY BECAUSE IT W.A.S CON-
TR.A.RY TO LA. W AND THE EVIDENCE. 
The jury, by its verdict, determined that the plaintiff was 
injured as a result of the wilful and malicious negligence of 
the defendant. The judgment rendered by the court on that 
verdict makes it the kind of judgment against which the de-
fendant could never be discharged in bankruptcy. 
In order to sustain the aforementioned verdict, the bur-
den was on the plaintiff to prove, by a preponderance of 
the evidence, not only that the defendant was negligent, but 
that his neg-ligence was wilful and malicious, that is, that 
the defendant deliberately, wilfully and maliciously intended 
to injure the plaintiff.. Not by any stretch of the imagina-
tion could the evidence i.n this case be construed to show any 
intent on the part of the defendant to wilfully and maliciously 
J'lln his automobile into the plaintiff. Therefore, the verdict 
of the jury that the plaintiff was injured as a result of the 
wilful and malicious neg-ligence on the part of the defendant 
is not supported by the evidence, and that sort of verdict 
should have been set aside. We expect to show further in 
this argument that the evidence would hardly sustain an al-
legation of simple or gross negligence. Of course, there is a 
vast difference between simple or gross negligence and wilful 
and malicious negligence. 
In order to sustain the verdict of the jury that the defend-
ant was guilty of "wilful and ma~icious negligence", the 
burden was upon the plaintiff toprove, by a preponderance 
of the evidenoo, that the defendant deliberately intended to 
· wilfully and maliciously injure him with the automobile, and 
evidence of simple or gross negligence is insufficient to sus-
tain such a verdict. There is not a scintilla of evidence in 
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the rooord to support the contention that the defendant wil-
fully and maliciously intended to injure the plaintiff with 
the automobile. Even if we assume that the evidence shows 
that the defendant intended to overtake the plaintiff for the 
. purpose of taking away the book or to reprimand him, or 
even to assault him, still that would not prove that the de-
fendant intended to injure the plaintiff with his automobile· .. 
A person driving an automobile may chase and intend to 
overtake another for the express purpose of having a fight 
with him, stili that same driver may not want to run his ad-
versary down with an automobile, because much more serious 
damage could be done to his adversary by running him down 
with an automobile than by merely assaulting him. One may 
be willing to slap or hit his adversary with his fist, resulting 
m very little, if any, damage, still he would not want to run 
that same person down with an automobile, which may cause 
very serious damage. 
In Young v. Dyer? 161 V a. 434; 170 S. E. 737, this court 
says: 
''A mere failure to skillfU:IIy operate an automobile under 
all conditions, or to be alert and observant, and to act in-
telligently and operate an automobile at a low rate of speed 
may, or may not, be a failure to do what an ordinarily pru-
dent person would have done under the circumstances, ·and 
thus amount to lack of ordinary care; but S'I.Wk lack of at-
tention and diligence, or mere inadvertence, does not amount 
to· wooton or reckless conduct, or constitute culpable ne.qli-
gence for which defendant would be responsible to an in-
vited guest. n ~Italics ours.) 
In the case of Doub v. Weave-r, decided. by this court on 
March 14th, 1935, in an opinion by ~{r. Chief Justice Camp-
bell, the principal of law laid down in the aforementioned 
case of Y owng v. Dyer was affirmed. 
In re Wt"lson, decided by the U. S. District Court of Mary-
land, opinion by Judge Rose, reported in 269 Fed. 845, the 
court held that an injury caused by illegally driving an au-
tomobile while intoxicated was not a wilful and malicious in-
jury, since it did not involve intent to cause the injury. 
In re Vena, decided by the U. S. District Court of Wash-
ington, reported in 46 Fed. Rep., 2nd Series, 81, wherein a 
seven-year-old child was injured by an automobile negli-
gently and recklessly driven over a street in the City of 
Seattle, the court says: 
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''That mere excessive speed, though wilful, does not im-
ply malice, I think, is uniformly held, but in addition to that, 
there must be some motive, or purpose against a person or 
persons, or a basis for inference of such purpose inspiring 
the speed. '' 
In the instant case, there is no contention that there was 
any intent to run over the plaintiff. 
In Tippett v. Sylvester, a New Jersey case, reported in 127 
Atlantic 321, in which it was sought to charge the defendant 
with wilfully and maliciously injuring the plaintiff because 
the defendant operated an automobile while intoxicated, the 
court says: 
''I do not think the mere fact of intoxication connotes wil-
ful or malicious injury. It may or may not prompt a wilful 
act, but we ca'nnot say because the driver was drunk his col-
lision was a wilful act.'' 
Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U. S. 473; 48 Law Edition, 754, was 
a case in which the question was raised as to whether the 
tort committed by the bankrupt was a wilful and malicious 
one so as not to be dischargeable in bankruptcy. The court 
held that it was not a malicious tort and, therefore, would 
not come within the exception of the debts dischargeable in 
bankruptcy. We quote from the opinion of the court as fol-
lows: 
''One who negligently drives through a crowded thorough-
fare and negligently runs over an individual would not, as 
we suppose, be within the exception. True, he drives negli-
.gently, and that is a wrongful act, bnt he does not intention-
ally drive over the individual.'' (Italics ours.) 
In re K~tbiniec, a New York case reported in 2 Fed. Sup-
plement 632, the court says : 
''Wilful negligence has been defined as that degree of neg-
ligence arising where there is a reckless indifference to the 
safety of human life, or an intentional failure to perform 
a manifest duty to the public,. in the performance of which 
the public and the party injured had an interest. To consti-
tute a wilful injury, the act tohi~h produced it 'must have been 
intentional, or must have been done under s~wh ·circwntStances 
as ·to evince a reckless disregard for the safety of others, and 
a willingness to inflict the injury co·mplained of.'' (Italics 
ours.) 
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The court quotes from the case of Tinker v. Colwell, supra, 
as follows: 
. "'A. wilful disregard of what one knows to be his duty, 
an act which is against good morals and wrongful in and 
of itself, and which necessarily causes the injury, and is done 
intet£tionally, may b.e said to be done wilfully and malicious-
ly.''' (Italics ours.) 
And on page 633, the court says : 
"We are inclined to the opinion that, under the Federal 
authorities, 'vilful and malicious injuries means. something 
more than i·njuries which chanced to happen by reason of 
an intentional unlawful act. These words signify to us the 
·intentional doinq of an act 'which must and does result in in-
jury to the pla~ntiff, or that class of torts in which malice 
and injury are always implied by law. Malice cannot be im-
plied and injury presumed in every case of violation of traffic 
laws, no matter how reckless they may be. There is no pre-
sumption of wilful injury, because even nominal injury does 
not necessarily result to the plaintiff creditor, or to any in-
dividual, as a result of the illegal act. The act is wilful; the 
result is accidental and negligent, but not wilful." (Italics 
ours.) 
The authorities above quoted clearly sustain our conten-
tion that in order for the tort to be ''wilful and malicious'', 
it must have been committed intentionally, and that mere 
negligence or even gross negligence resulting in injury to 
another does not make the tort a ''wilful and malicious'' one. 
Therefore, applying the aforementioned authorities to the 
evidence in the case at bar, there is not a scintilla of evidence 
showing that the defendant wilfully or maliciously intended 
to injure the plaintiff with his automobile, and the verdict of 
· the jury in deciding that the defendant was guilty of a "wil-
ful and malicious'' tort is not supported by the evidence and 
should have been set aside. 
What we have said above 'vould apply to the case at bar 
even though the evidence showed that the defendant was 
guilty of simple or gross negligence. But we further con-
tend that the evidence shows that the defendant was not guilty 
of negligence and that the plaintiff was injured as a result of 
his own negligence. 
While it is true that the verdict of the jury on a question 
of'fact is conclusive, yet that does not apply, as this court has 
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numerously held, where the facts upon which the jury's ver-
dict is based are contrary to reason or human experience. 
In Burks's Pleading and Practice, 3rd Edition, page 553, 
it is said: 
''Thus, where the great prepondera:nee of the evidence is 
against the verdict, at least 'vhere the facts and circumstances 
of the case support this preponderance of the evidence, or 
where the evidence in support of the verdict and judgment is 
incredible or physieally impossible, or where on the whole evi-
dence there is a plain deviation from right and justice, the 
appellate court may properly set aside the verdict and judg-
ment.'' (Italics ours.) 
Meade v. Saunders, 151 Va. 641; 144 S. E. 711. 
An examination of the whole evidence in the case at bar 
will clearly show that there was a plain deviation from right 
and justice. · ~ 
The defendant's testimony clearly shows that he was not 
chasing the plaintiff and had no idea where the plaintiff was. 
It was while on his way to Mrs. Morsch ell's home that he 
happened to see the plaintiff and his associate, Watford, 
· standing on the sidewalk talking. It was the most natural 
thing for the defendant, who wanted to locate a book that 
was of material value to him, to stop and ask the plaintiff 
what became of the book. There certainly was no reason 
for the· defendant to try to take froni the plaintiff the $1.25 
which the latter collected for him, when the defendant was 
indebted to the plaintiff to the extent of $2.50 for one-half 
weeks' salary. The defendant could have offset that $1.25 
against the plaintiff's claim. It was most natural for the de-
fendant, who wanted to carry on a conversation with the 
plaintiff and could not park on a busy thoroughfare, to drive 
around a side street and park his car thereon. An examina-
tion of the defendant's testimony will show that it was more 
reasonable than the plaintiff's testimony, which is contra-
dicted as hereinafter shoWn, and is contrary to the physical 
facts. · 
The plaintiff and his witness, Watford, testified at the 
trial of the case, which occurred several months after the no-
tice of motion for. judgment was filed, that he and Watford 
were not standing on the sidewalk, but· were riding along 
Newport Avenue when their attention was attracted by the 
noise of the defendant's car. A reference to the original no-
tice of motion for judgment filed by the plaintiff in this case 
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will show the untruthfulness of that testimony. In the origi-
nal notice of motion for judgment, set out in .Certificate of 
Exception No. 6 (R., pp. 24, 25) the plaintiff alleges: ''On 
J ui:J.e 14, 1934, the said William Jordan was standilng on New-
port Ave'lliUe, in the City of Norfolk, near its intersection with 
<:korgia Avenue, 'vith a bicycle which he had been using and 
intended to use near at hand. He then and there perceived 
you, in an automobile driven by you, proceeding northwardly 
along said Newport Avenue towards him.*** ·He thereupon 
got upon his bicycle and rode northwardly along Newport 
Avenue, and turned to the right into Georgia Avenue at the 
intersection of said A venues.'' 
It will be observed that the original notice of motion for 
judgment was drawn very shortly after the plaintiff was in-
jured, and almost seven ll!Onths before the trial of tl1e case 
wherein the plaintiff testified. It is· to he assumed that when 
counsel prepared the original notice of motion for judgment 
and used the language therein contained, that they prepared 
it in accordance with the statement given them by their 
client, the plaintiff. It is fair to assume that if the plaintiff 
had told his counsel the same statement as to what he testi-
fied to at the trial, counsel certainly would not have alleged in 
the original notice of motion for judgment that the plaintiff 
was standing on Newport Avenue 'With a bicycle which he 
had been usilng and intended to use, implying that he was not 
riding the bicycle at the time the defendant saw him. Nor 
would plaintiff's counsel have used the language in the origi-
nal notice of motion for judgment that "He'' (plaintiff) 
"thereupon got 'ltpon his bicycle", clearly indicating that the 
plaintiff had been standing arid then got on his bicycle. The 
allegations in the original notice of motion for judgment 
clearly sustain the defendant's evidence that the plaintiff 
and Watford were standing on the sidewalk when he ap-
proached them and asked for the book. On the morning of 
the trial of this case, which was nearly seven months after 
the plaintiff was injured, the latter, realizing that an ad-
herence to those allegations would be detrimental to his case, 
made a motion for the first time to amend the notice of mo-
tion, changing materially the allegations in the original no-
tice. 
We contend that the original notice of motion for judgment, 
which was prepared shortly after the plaintiff was injured, 
and, no doubt, based upon the statements which the plain-
tiff made to his counsel, and which were much fresher i·n his 
mind at that time than they were at the time of the trial, shows 
the manner in which the plaintiff was injured, and· bears out 
the defendant's evidence. Therefore, when at the trial of 
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the case the plaintiff testified to a state of facts contrary to 
his allegations in the original notice of motion, it was not 
true. 
Furthermore, the plaintiff and his· stepfather testified posi-
tively: that from the day he was injured, to-wit, June 14th, 
1934, to the date of the trial, to-wit, January 3rd, 1935, a pe-
riod of :pearly seven months, he was physically unable to 
work and did not work as a result .of his said injuries (R., pp. 
7, 13). Whereas, on the other hand, Mr. Bernard Baker, a 
disinterested person, made affidavit subsequent to the trial, 
that for a period of five weeks beginning in September, 1934, 
the plaintiff 'vorked for him and even rode a bicycle. Mr. 
Baker's affidavit was not contradicted. By Mr. Baker's af-
fidavit, the testimony of the plaintiff and Blunt, his step-
father, as to the plaintiff's physical disability is shown to 
be untrue. The evidence, therefore, shows that the plain-
tiff's testimony is contradicted in two material phases of the 
·case. 
The plaintiff's evidence is contrary to the physical facts in 
the case. The plaintiff testified that he was riding his bicycle 
close to the curb and the defendant followed right behind him 
(R., p. 6). Thus, according to the testimony of the plain-
tiff, the defendant's automobile was close to the right-hand 
curb. The evidence of the plaintiff's witnesses, Jones and 
Wilder (R., p. 12) was that when they came up to the scene 
of the accident, the defendant's automobile was on Georgia 
Avenue, five or six feet from its intersection with Newport 
A venue and pointing to the right. It would have been a 
physical impossibility for the defendant's automobile to have 
been in that position on Georgia Avenue if he was driving it 
at the rate of twenty miles per hour on Newport A venue close 
to the right curb, as was testified to by the plaintiff. The 
ev_idence of J\{r. McCraw, a witness for the plaintiff (R., p. 
10) that the plainti1! and the defendant were close to the curb 
is likewise contrary to the physical facts for the reasons here-
tofore stated. 
Therefore, since the plaintiff's evidence, as above set out, 
is contrary to the physical facts, and his testimony is con-
tradicted in two material aspects, one as to his physical in-
capacity by the unimpeached affidavit of Mr. Baker, and the 
other by his o'vn notice of motion for judgment contradicting 
his evidence that he was not standing on the sidewalk, he 
has failed to prove his case by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, and the jury's verQict is, therefore, contrary to law 
and the evidence, and is on the whole plainly wrong· and should 
he set aside. 
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2. THE VERDICT OF THE JURY W .AS EXCESSIVE. 
The only damage proven in this case was the injury and 
suffering of th~ plaintiff. There was no evidence of any 
medical expense or loss of tin1e. The undisputed evidence 
is that the plaintiff's injuries were of a minor nature. Dr. 
Glasser, the only physician whd attended the plaintiff, tes-
tified that he visited the latter three times and did not feel 
that his condition called for any further treatment (R., p. 
19). Therefore, the undisputed evidence is that the plain-
tiff's injuries did not require any extensive medical treat-
ment. It is also fair to assume that had the plaintiff needed 
any further medical treatment, that either Dr. Glasser would 
have continued. such treatment or the plaintiff would have 
obtained such treatment from another doctor. It may also be 
fair to assume that if the plaintiff had been injured to the 
extent as he testified, that he certainly would have had some 
oth.er doctor to treat him after Dr. Glasser discharged him 
on his third visit as cured. ~,urthermore, the evidence shows 
that the plaintiff went back to work some time in September, 
1934. ·Certainly, a verdict for $1,500.00 for slight injuries 
such as the plaintiff sustained is excessive. 
In C. D. Kenny Company Y. Solom.on, 163 S. E. 97, this 
court, in reversing a verdict of $2,500.00 for the plaintiff be-
cause it was excessive, says: 
"The evidence shows that the injury received by the de-
fendant in error was slight and temporary; that he was away 
from his work only thirty-four days; that his loss of wages 
amounted to only $200.00; that he had· expended a nominal 
amount for his medical and other expense. In addition to 
these things, he suffered a short time with stiffness of his 
neck. There is no evidence of extreme suffering or of any 
unusual pain. -
"While we think that the defendant in error is entitled to 
some damages for his injurv, our conclusion is that the award 
of $2,500.00 allowed by the"' jury is ,qreatly out of proportio'J'I 
to the temporary injury sustained by him. The jury mani-
festly disregarded the evidence as to the extent of the injury. 
An injustice will be done to permit the verdict to stand.'' 
(Italics ours.) 
If we deduct from the verdict in the case of Kenny v. Solo-
mon, supra, the loss of wages and medical expenses proven in 
that case, the amount of that verdict would be nearly the same 
as the verdict in the case at bar. Therefore, the langu-age of the 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia in the aforementioned 
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case of Kenny v. Solomon, that the amount allowed by the jury 
was greatly out of proportion to the injury sustained by the 
plaintiff, is ·clearly applicable to the case at bar. 
It may be argued that the reason the jury found such a 
large verdict 'vas because it allowed punitive damages in 
addition to the actual damages sustained. Although, as we 
have shown above, the defendant did not commit a wilful and 
malicious tort and, hence, no punitive damages could be al-
lowed, still, if we assume, for the sake of argument, that if 
this was a case where punitive damages could be allowed, the 
verdict of the jury is excessive. 
The purpose of the law in awarding damages to a plaintiff 
for injuries sustained by him is to compensate for the in-
juries, that is, to put him as nearly as money can do in the 
same condition he was in before he was injured. Punitive 
damages are awarded, not for the purpose of giving the 
plaintiff more damages than he sustained, but merely for the 
purpose of punishing the wrong-doer. Therefore, even in 
a case where a wrong was committed wilfully and maliciously, 
if the verdict of the jury is in excess of the amount neces-
sary to punish the wrong-doer, such verdict is excessive. 
In Pendleton v. Norfolk atnd lVestern Railway Company, 
82 W. Va. 270; 95 S. E. 941; 16 A. L. R. 761, the court says: 
"Punitive damages should not be awarded in a case where 
the amount of the compensatory damages is adequate to 
punish the defendant, and in a case where such compensatory 
damages are not in the judgment of the jury adequate for 
the purpose of punishment, only such additional amount 
should be awarded as taken together with the compensatory 
damages will be sufficient for that purpose. 
''In a case where it is proper to award punitive damages, 
the amount of such award must bear some reas9nable pro-
portion to the amount of compensatory damages.'' 
In Weatherford v. Birchett, 158 Va. 741; 164 S. E. 535, the 
court says: 
''Exemplary damages are those given, not as a pecuniary 
compensation for the loss actually sustained by the plaintiff, 
but as a warning to the defendant and to others, to prevent 
a repetition, or commission, of similar wrongs. 
· "Such damage is not given the plaintiff as a matter of 
right. If the evidence establishes, or tends to establish, 
malice in fact, his right is to have the jury instructed that 
they, in their discretion, may assess the defendant with an 
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- additional· snm, not so much to compensate the plaintiff, but 
to punish the defendant. In assessing this class of damages, 
evidence of the financial standing of the defendant may be 
considered by the jury." (Italics ours.) 
In Norfolk and fVestern Rail·way Company v. Neely, 91 
Va. 539, the court says: 
''Actual or compensatory damages are the measure of the 
loss or injury sustained, while exmnplary or punitive dam-
ages are something in addition to full compensation, and 
something not given as his due, but for the protection of the 
public. The law a.,vards the former only where in the unla,v- · 
ful act there is an absence of intentional wrong·, fraud or 
malice, or the act is not oppressively or recklessly committed; 
while the latter are given where the wrongful act is done 
with a bad motive, or with such gross negligence as to amount 
· to positive misconduct, or in a manner so wanton or reckless 
as to manifest a wilful disregard of the rights of others.'' 
In the case at bar, the defendant operated a small grocery 
store. A verdict for the amount of actual damage sustained 
·by the plaintiff would have been sufficient punishment. to the 
defendant, even though we assume that the defendant was 
guilty of wilful and malicious negligence. Hence, in view of 
the authorities above cited, the verdict of the jury 'vas mani-
festly excessive. 
3. THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING INSTRUCTION 
NO. 2 FOR THE PLAINTIFF OVER THE OBJECTION. 
OF THE DEFENDANT (R., p. 21). 
There was absolutely no evidence of any wilfulness or ma-
liciousness on the part of the defendant, as set out in the 
facts heretofore quoted in support of our first assignment of 
error. Hence, Instruction No. 2, which told the jury that if 
the plaintiff's injury resulted from the wilfulness or ma-
liciousness on the part of the defendant, they may award 
punitive damages, etc., was erroneous. 
It is well settled law in this State that an instruction should 
not be given where there is no evidence tending to prove the 
facts upon which it is .based. 
In Dupont Engineering OompO/fl/lJ v. Blair, 129 Va. 423, 
the court says : 
"Instructions ought not to be given which are not ap-
plicable to the evidence, and to give them constitutes reversal 
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error when there is reason to suppose that they probably 
misled the jury.'' 
In Wittstruck v. Lee, 92 A. L. R. 1361, the court says: 
''It is error to submit to the jury by the instructions a 
state of facts which there is no evidence tending to prove.'' 
In Michie's Virginia and West ·virginia Digest, Volume 4, 
page 622, it is said: 
''It is error to instruct the jury that if they find the plain-
tiff is entitled to damages they shall take into consideration 
the injuries sustained by him and what amount is necessary 
to compensate him therefor, and that if they further find that 
the defendant did the injuries complained of in a wanton or 
wilful manner, or from a reckless indifference to the rights 
and safety of the plaintiff or his property, they may find 
such further damages as they may believe the plaintiff is 
entitled to, in assessing punitive damages the correct rule 
being that if the jury find that the acts con1plained of were 
malicious or wanton or in reckless disregard of the plain-
tiff's right they may allow punitive damages for such amount 
as added to the actual damages sustained will be sufficient 
to punish the defendant and to deter others from committing 
like offenses.'' (Citing Swiger v. Runn.ion, 90 W. Va. 322, 
111 S. E. 318.) 
In LuJfy v. Lockhart, 37 Arizona 488; 295 Pacific 975, the 
court says: 
·"If the evidence showed that the defendant operated an au-
tomobile in a wilful or wanton manner, contributory negli-
gence would not be a defense, but that no facts 'tvere alleged 
sho~uin.g that the defendant ran i1~to the plaintiff purposely 
or intentionally, or that he 'Was indifferent as to the resu.lt 
of his act; it appearing that the defendant approached the in-
tersection at a speed of about thirty-five miles per hour; that 
he gave no warning of his approach, by blowing a horn or 
otherwise, that he ran into plaintiff within four or five feet 
of the curb; and it appeared from the defendant's testimony 
that the plaintiff, without looking, stepped in front of the 
automobile and was knocked down, and that the defendant's 
control was such that the car was stopped with one revolu-
tion of the wheel." (Italics ours.) 
Since there was no evidence to prove that the defendant 
wilfully and maliciously intended to injure the plaintiff, 
there was no evidence to support Instruction No 2, the giving 
of which was, undoubtedly, prejudicial to the defendant. 
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4. THE COURT El~RED IN REFUSING TO SET ASIDE 
THE VERDICT OF THE JURY ON THE GROUND OF 
AFTER-DISCOVERED EVIDENCE. 
It will be observed that the plaintiff and his step-father 
testified that as a result of the injuries sustained by the 
former, he was totally 'incapacitated for the entire period be-
g'inning June 14th, 1934, when he was injured, up to the time 
of the trial, which was held on January 3rd, 1935, a period 
of nearly seven months. The evidence of Mr. Bernard 
Baker, which was uncontradicted, was that the plaintiff was 
able to work and did work for a period of five weeks, be-
ginning sometime in September, 1934. If Baker's testimony 
had been available _at the trial of this case, not only would 
such testimony have impeached the plaintiff's testimony, but 
it also would have had a tendency to decrease the amount 
of damages allowed by the jury, for even though if we as-
sume, for the sake of argument, that the plaintiff was in-
capacitated for any length of time (and his doctor testified 
that he was not), it is self-evident that he would have been 
entitled to less damages if he were incapacitated for three 
months than if he were incapacitated for approximately seven 
months, as testified to by him. Baker is a white person and 
had no interest in the case, and it may be fairly assumed 
that .his testimony would have probably produced a different 
. verdict. 
The defendant comes within the well-settled rule of law 
which allows a new trial for after-discovered eviden~e, in that 
(a) The evidence 'vas discovered since the trial; (b) It is 
material in its object and such as on another trial ought .to 
produce opposite results on the merits; (c) It is not cumu-
lative, corroborative or collateral; (d) It is evidence that could 
not have been discovered before the trial by the use of due 
diligence, and is such as can be produced at another trial. 
Burks' Pleading and Practice, 3rd Edition, 536. 
That the requirements set out in (a), (b) and (c) in the 
preceding paragraph have been complied with is self-evident. 
The requirements set out in (d) in the preceding paragraph 
hav~ also been complied with. 
In the notice of motion for judgment, the plaintiff does 
not make any claim for future pain or future loss of time. 
The defendant, therefore, had the right to assume that the 
plaintiff would only prove such loss of time and suffering 
that existed up to the time this suit was filed. The defend-
ant could not anticipate that the plaintiff would undertake to 
prove suffering and loss of time for a period not covered in 
his notice of motion for judgment. 
. I 
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The defendant by his evidence, which was uncontradicted, 
shows that he could not, by ·due ·diligence, have discovered 
the aforementioned evidence before the trial because he did 
not know the plaintiff had worked for Baker. No doubt, after 
the report went out that the plaintiff had obtained a large 
verdict against the defendant, the matter was probably dis-
cussed, and in that way the defendant ascertained that the 
plaintiff had worked for Baker. 
For the reasons above set forth, the Court of Law and 
Chancery of the City of Norfolk, as your petitioner is ad-
vised and now charges, erred to his prejudice in its ruling and 
judgment aforesaid; and for the errors so made and other 
-errors apparent on the face of the record, the judgment of 
the said Court of Law and Chancery of the City of Norfolk 
in awarding the plaintiff a verdict for the sum of. $1,500.00, -
as heretofore set out, should be reviewed and rev-ersed. And 
your petition~r accordingly prays that this Honorable . .Court 
will grant unto him a writ of error to the judgment afore-
said, and will review and reverse said judgment, and either 
enter a final judgment in favor of your petitioner, or remand 
the case to the said .Court of Law and Chancery of the City 
of Norfolk for further proceedings, according to law, as 
this. court shall deem advisable. 
And as in duty bound, your petitioner will ever pray, etc. 
HENRY P. FRIEDJ\fAN. 
By HERMAN A. SACKS, 
His Counsel. 
I, Herman A. Sacks, an attorney practicing in the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of Virginia, do certify that in my opinion . 
the judgment complained of in· the foregoing petition should 
he reviewed by the Supreme ·Court of Appeals of Virginia. . 
HERMAN A. SACKS. 
Copy of this petition received this 4th day of April, 1935. 
BAIRD, W-HITE & LANNING, 
Attorneys for William Jordan, 
Defendant in Error. 
Received April 5, 1935. 
M. B. WATTS, Clerk. 
Writ of error granted. Bond $200. May 13, 1935. 
J. W. EGGLESTON. 
R-eceived May 14, 1935. 
M. B. WATTS~ Clerk. 
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PLEAS before the Court of La,v and Chancery of the 
City of Norfolk, at the Courthouse of said City, on Tues-
day, the 12th day of 1\iarch, 1935. 
BE IT REMEMBERED, that heretofore, to-wit: On the 
5th day of July, 1934, came William Jordan, an infant, by 
Richard S. Barron, his next friend, plaintiff, by his attorneys, 
and :filed in the Clerk's Of.fice of said ·Court his Notice of 
Motion for judgment against Henry P. Friedman, defend-
ant, in the words and figures following : 
NOTICE OF l\fOTION FOR JUDGMENT .. 
To Henry P. Friedman: 
TAKE NOTICE that on Friday the 20th day of July, 1934, 
at 10:00 A. l\L or as soon thereafter as he can be heard, 
William Jordan, an infant under the age of 21 years, who 
sues by Richard S. Barron his next friend, will move the 
Court of La'v and ~Chancery of the City of Norfolk, Virginia:, 
at its Court room in said City, for a Judgment in his favor 
against you for $1,500.00. Said sum has become due by you 
to him as damages for injuries caused him by you at the fol-
lowing time and place and under the following· circumstances : 
On J nne 14, 1934, the said William Jordan was riding a 
bicycle on Newport Avenue, in the City of Norfolk, near its 
intersection with Georgia A venue. He then and there per-
ceived you, in an automobile driven by you, proceeding north-
wardly along said Newport Avenue towards him. He then 
had reason to believe and did believe you were pur-
page 2 ~ suing him in an attempt to take from him a sum of 
money, to-wit: $1.25, which you claimed he owed 
you and he denied owing you. He thereupon rode north-
wardly along Newport A venue, and turned to the right into 
Georgia Avenue, at the intersection of said avenues. You 
then increased the speed of your automobile and also turned 
to the dght into Georgia A venue in pursuit of said William 
Jordan, and, in an effort to stop him and take said sum of 
money from him, you then and there negligently, wrongfully, 
wilfully and deliberately ran your automobile into, upon, 
against and over him with great force and violence, throw-
ing him to the ground, and causing him severe mental shoclc 
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and great physical injury in and about the head, arms, legs 
and other parts of the body. As a result he has been caused 
great suffering and much loss of time which he would have 
otherwise spent in the pursuit of a lawful and gainful occu-
pation, and has been put to much trouble and expense in at-
tempting to be cured of said injuries. Demand has been made 
upon you for the damages aforesaid and payment has been 
neglected and declined. 
By reaso·n of the premises the undersigned is entitled to 
have and recover of and from you the said sum of $1,500.00 
and all -costs in this behalf expended. 
WILLIAM JORDAN, 
By Richard S. Barron, his next friend. 
By BAIRD, WHITE & LANNING, 
His Attorneys. 
RliJTURN. 
Executed in the City of Norfolk, Va., this the 3 day of 
July, 1934, bv serving a copy hereof on Henry P. Friedman, 
in person. .. 
OHAS. E. FRANCIS, 
Sergt. City of Norfolk, V a. 
By C. B. LESNER, Deputy. 
page 3 } And afterwards: In the Court of Law and Chan-
cery of the City of Norfolk, on the 21st day of 
July, 1934. · 
This day came the parties, by their attorneys, and there-
upon the defendant pleaded not guilty to which the plaintiff 
r~plied generally. 
And afterwards: In said .Court, on the 3rd day of Janu-
ary, 1935. . 
Present The Honorable James U. Goode, Judge of the 
Corporntion Court of the City of Norfolk Number Two, sit-
ting at the request of the Judge of this Court. 
Thi~ day came the parties, by their attorneys, and there-
upon the defendant filed herein his plea of contributory ne~­
ligence, and then came a jury, to-wit: J. W. 0''Connor, A. J. 
West, W. B. Hastings, Z. A. Gay, J. W. Calvert, W. P. White, 
and Jno. Wales, Jr., who being sworn the truth to speak 
upon the issue joined, and having heard the evidence, re-
turned a verdict in these words: "We the Jury, find for the 
22 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
plaintiff in the sum of fifteen hundred dollars, believing it 
was the result willful and malicious negligence, W. B. Hast-
ings Foreman.'' 
·whereupon the defendant moved the Court to set aside 
the verdict of the Jury and grant him a ne'v trial on the 
grounds that the said verdict of the jury is contrary to the 
law and the evidence, the hearing of which motion is con-
tinued. 
PLEA OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
The said defendant, by his attorneys, comes and says, that 
the plaintiff is not entitled to recover in this case, because 
he was himself guilty of negligence in riding on 
page 4 ~ his bicycle in front of the defendant's approaching 
automobile which negligence on the part of the 
plaintiff contributed to his injury. 
And this the said defendant is ready to verify. 
And now, in said Court on the 12th day of March, 1935. 
Present: The Honorable James U. Goode, Judge of the 
Corporation Court of the City of Norfolk, Number Two, sit-
ting at the request of the Judge of this Court. 
This day came again the plaintiff, William Jordan, by his 
attorney, and the defendant, Ifenry ~· Friedman, .by his at-
torney, and the said defendant, in pursuance of leave hereto-
fore given him and within the time allowed by law therefor, 
tendered his six· certificates of exception numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, 
5 and 6, after it duly appeared that proper written notice 
pursuant to law of the time and place of the presenting of 
said certificates of exception had been given to the plaintiff, 
who was present by Counsel when such certificates were pre-
sented and filed, which certificates were received, signed and 
sealed by the Court and ordered to be made a part of the 
record in this case. 
The following are the certificates of exception referred to 
in the foregoing order : 
page 5 ~ CERTIFICA:-rE OF EXCEPTION NO. 1. 
The following evidence on behalf of the plaintiff and the 
defendant, respectively, as hereinafter denoted, is all the 
_evidence that was introduced at the trial of this cause: 
. Henry P. Friedman v. Wm. Jordan, etc. -23 
WILLIAM JO·RDAN, colored, 
testified on his o'vn behalf as follows: 
I ain 18 years old. At the time of my injury I was working 
as a delivery boy for the defendant, carrying groceries on a 
bicycle for $5.00 a week. On the morning of Thursday, June 
14, 1934, I got to his store about seven o'clock and shortly 
afterwards went out on several deliveries, carrying a re-
eeipt book to be signed by the customers. I returned to the 
store about eight-thirty with $1.25 which I had collected for 
C. 0. D. orders, and the receipt book which I placed on top 
. of the cash register. ~ir. Friedman then told me he did not 
like the way I was using his bicycle and fired me. I asked 
him when l!e was going to pay me for working that week 
and he said to come back that night and he would do so. He 
asked me to give him the $1.25 which I had collected. I told 
him that I would give it to him when he paid me off and went 
on out of his store. I found temporary employment at Mr. 
Klavans' grocery store several doors down from Mr. Fried-
man's market. I was sent out to deliver some groceries on 
a bicycle about an hour later with William Watford, who 
was working for Mr. Klavans. When we rode by Mr. Fried-
man's, he ran out of his store and hollered at me about his 
money. We did not stop so he jumped on his bicycle which 
was standing by the curb and rode out on the street towards 
me, but then turned around and went back again in a circle. 
I did not see him again until about half an hour 
page 6 ~ later when Watford and I were riding northwardly 
along Newport A venue fifty or sixty yards south of 
its intersection with Georgia A venue. We were riding· along 
slowly in the street and I heard a car coming up behind me. 
I looked back and saw Mr. Friedman in his car. ·He was 
behind me. I then rode as fast as I could northwardly along 
Newport Avenue and could hear him coming right behind 
me. I kept close to the curb in the street and was never on the 
sidewalk. When I got to the corner of Newport and Georg·ia 
Avenues, I turned sharply to the right into Georgia Avenue. 
He followed right behind me and before I had gotten twenty 
or thirty feet down Georgia A venue close to the right-hand 
curb he ran into me. I do not know just what part of the 
car hit me and all I remember is that I fell over on my bicycle 
under the front of the car. The next thing I remembered was 
that my legs and hips were all tangled up in the bicycle under 
the middle of Mr. Friedman's car, which was pointing to-
ward the right-hand curb stone about twenty feet .from the 
corner I had just turned. My head and shoulders were stick-
ing out from under the car about midway of the running 
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board on the right-hand side. My legs were bleeding and 
hurting me very much just above the knees. My right shoul-
der had been jammed against the right-hand curb stone and 
I could not move much. Mr. Friedman was standing neal" 
me:shouting ''Give me my money, give me my money''. He put 
his hands in my pockets and looked around under the car. He 
did not try to help me but kept talking about his money. 
Several people came up and he jumped back in his car, b:ut 
someone told him not to back up because he would run over 
me again. Then someone helped me get out from under 
the car and I tried to run but fell down. One of 
page 7 ~ the men offered to take me to the hospital, but Mr .. 
Friedman said "That's my nigger, I'll take him tQ 
the hospital''.· The bicycle was hung up under the car and 
they could not get it out, so a colored man took me in his 
car to St. Vincent's Hospital. I stayed at the hospital about 
two or three hours while the doctors treated and bandaged 
my legs and shoulder. Mr. I{lavans sent his car and took 
me home. I staved in bed for about two weeks and have 
not been able to .. work any since then. The car had rolled 
over both of my legs just above the knees. They have healed 
pretty well, but my shoulder is still sore and I cannot lift 
anything heavy with my right arm. For two or three months 
I was not able to rruse my right hand higher than my 
shoulder. 
WILLIAM JORDAN .. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
When...l.ggt]nui,J. did_IJ9t have Mr. Friedman"s book with 
the signatures· of some· of his customers showing the receipt 
by them of merchandise. I had left it on his cash register. 
Watford and I were not standing on the sidewalk along New-
port Avenue when Mr. Friedman drove up. We 'vere ridrng 
our bicycles. 
WILLIAM WATFORD, colored, 
testified on behalf of the plaintiff as follows: 
I am 19 years old. On the day William Jordan got hurt I 
was working as a delivery boy for Mr. Klavans, whose gro-
cery store is near Mr. Friedman "s market. About nine 
o'clocir that morning Jordren came to Mr. Klavans" store and 
got a temporary job in the place of a delivery boy who was 
not there at that time. Around an hour later, Jor-
page 8 ~ dan and I went out to deliver some groceries on 
our bicycles. When we rode by Mr. Friedman's, 
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he ran out of his store and hollered something about money 
at Jordan. Neither of us said anything to him and kept on 
riding. One of his bicycles was standing at the curb. He 
jumped on it and rode out toward us. We had g·otten a little 
way down the street by then so he turned around and rode 
back. I guess he didn't think he could catch us. We went 
on and a little later while we were riding· northwardly along 
Newport Avenue about fifty or sixty yards from its inter-
section with Georgia Avenue, I heard a car behind us. We 
looked around and saw it was 1\tir. Friedman in his car. I 
kept riding at the same speed but Jordan began to pull away 
from me. He got \veil over to the right-hand side of the 
street. 1\tir. Friedman's car passed close by me. It was 
going around twenty miles an hour, I guess. He kept right 
on after Jordan. The boy made a sharp right-hand turn 
into Georgia Avenue and 1\{r. ll,riedman swerved in right 
behind him. They were not fiv.e or six feet apart then. J or-
dan was riding within a few feet of the curb on the right-hand 
side of Georgia A venue and the car kept getting closer and 
closer without slowing down or moving out of his way. When 
they had gotten about ten or fifteen feet down Georgia Ave-
nue from the corner, 1\{r. Friedman ran right into the bicycle 
and the boy fell down in front of the car and it rolled over 
him. It made a lot of noise because the bicycle dragged along 
the street and got all crushed up. Mr. Friedman stopped 
pretty quickly after he hit the boy. I came up to the corner, 
got off my bicycle and ran up to the car. It was about twelve 
feet from the corner, pointing towards the right-hand curb 
of ·Georgia A venue. ,Jordan was laying under it 
page 9 ~ with his head and shoulders sticking· out almost un-
der the middle of the right-hand running· board. 
He was screaming about his legs and struggling·. Mr. Fried-
man got pretty excited and was running arou1.1-d hollering at 
William about his money. Two or three people came up by 
that time and Mr. Friedman jumped back in the car. Some-
one shouted at him not to back up because he would run 
over the boy again. He then stayed in the car for a little 
while and got out later. Two or three more people had 
come up by then and were trying to get the boy from under 
the car. One of them offered to take him to the hospital 
r but Mr. F'riedman said "That's my nigger, I'll take him to 
the hospital". He was standing around talking a lot and I 
heard him saying to the boy "That serves you right". Soon 
a colored man came along in his car and we picked Jordan 
up and put him in it, and they went on off to the hospital. 
The boy's clothes had been torn up and his knees and legs 
were bleeding. He could not sta:nd on his feet and seemed 
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to be very much frightened. We worked for a long time 
getting the bicycle from under the car. It was all bent up 
and looked as if the wheel had rolled over it between tlie 
seat and sprocket. I did not see 1\{r. Friedman make any 
attempt to help us get Jordan out from under the car. 
WILLIAM WATFORD. 
CROSS EXA1\1:INATION. 
Jordan and I were not standing on t~e sidewalk talking 
when Mr. Friedman approached us on Newport Avenue. He 
did not ask us for a receipt book. IIe did not say anything 
to me when he went by, he was looking right ahead at J or-
dan. We were riding in the street all the time, and not on 
the sidewalk. 
pag·e 10 ~ J. E. McCRAW. 
testified on behalf of the plaintiffs as follows: 
I am 64 years old and live on the northwest corner of New-
port and Georgia Avenues, diagonally · opposite the corner 
near which the collision occurred. I was sitting on my front 
porch reading a newspaper and my attention was attracted 
by the noise of an automobile on the street. I looked up and 
saw a Buick sedan proceeding northwardly along Newport 
Avenue about twenty or thirty. yards south of its intersection 
with Georgia Avenue~- About eight or ten feet in front of it 
I saw plaintiff riding a bicycle with a grocery basket on it. 
He was close to the curb and so was the car. The boy was 
riding as hard as he could and the car kept coming right on 
behind him. It looked like the man in the car was chasing 
him because he got closer and closer and kept behind the 
bicycle. When they got to the corner of Newport and 
Georgia Avenues, the boy turned sharply to the right into 
Georgia Avenue and the car turned in directly behind him 
without slowing down. They went .along a little way close 
in to the right-hand curb, the car getting closer and closer. 
It then shut out the bicycle from my view and I heard a 
crash and the car slowed down and stopped. Somebody be~ 
g·an -screaming and crying and I got up and walked do~ 
to the corner to see if the boy was badly hurt. The front 
wlleels of the car were about fifteen feet from the corner and 
it was pointing in towards the curb on the right-hand side of 
Georgia Avenue. The boy was lying in the gutter with ·his 
legs and hips directly under the middle of the car. The bicycle 
was up under there and the boy's feet seemed -to be hung up 
/ 
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in it. Mr. Friedman was sitting in the driver's seat. Some-
body was helping the boy get out from under the 
page 11 ~ car and when he got free he tried to run but fell 
down on the grass and was screaming about his 
legs. His pants were torn badly and his legs were bleeding. 
I guess the car was going about twenty miles an hour when it 
struck the bicycle. Nothing indicated that Mr. Friedman put 
on his brakes until after he hit the boy. A colored man -came 
by in an automobile and picked the boy up and carried him 
to the hospital. The bic.ycle was hung up under the ear 
and it took about an hour to get it free. 
J. E. McCRAW .. 
CROSS EXA1\IIINATION. 
When I first saw the automobile, the boy was riding along 
right in front of it. l did not notice another colored boy 
then riding a bicycle. There were several colored boys there 
right after the accident and one or two bieycles laying 
around. Automobiles drive up and down Newport Avenue 
quite frequently. I saw the boy on Newport A. venue about 
thirty yards from. the corner and watched him up· until just 
a second before he was run over, when the car shut him out 
from my view. He was riding in the street close to the curb 
.and was never on the sidewalk. I am quite sure of that be-
cause I would not have ·watched them if the circumstances 
bad not been so unusual. 
F. H. JONES 
testified on behalf of the pla~tiff as follows: 
On the day that plaintiff was injured, I was painting the 
rear of a house near the intersection of Newport and Georgia 
Avenues with Mr. C. M. Wilder. We heard the noise of a col-
lision and then somebody began t.o scream and holler ter-
ribly. We ran around to the front of the house 
page 12} and saw the car with the bicycle under it. The 
boy was lying on the grass adjacent to the side-
walk. The car was five or six feet from the corner and 
pointed in towards the right-hand side of the street-it was 
not headed straight down Georgia Avenue. Mr. Friedman 
was standing on the curb hollering at the boy about some 
money and I heard him say "You got what was coming to 
you'' or s·omething like that. The boy tried to stand up 
but fell down in the grass. His pants were all toni and his 
legs were bleeding. A colored man came by in his car and 
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we picked the boy up and put him in it and they went on off. 
I stayed around for sometime after that helping to get the 
picyele from under the car. It was bent up right bad nea:r; 
the sprocket. 
C. :M. WILDER 
testified on behalf of the plaintiff as follows: 
I was painting with ~fr. Jones on the day of the accident .. 
We heard the collision and somebody hollering. When we 
got to the car the bicycle was just about under the front right-
hand door. The car 'vas about five or six feet from the 
corner and was pointed in towards the right-hand side of 
Georgia Avenue. I offered to take Jordan to the hospital,. 
but Mr. Friedman said "That's my nigger-I'Il take him to 
the hospital''. We could not get the -bicycle out from under 
the car for some time, so finally a colored man came by in 
his car and took the boy off. We finally got the bicycle out 
and I saw that it was pretty badly bent up, and looked as if 
the wheel had passed over it a little bit sidewise near the 
seat. -
page 13 ~ EDWARD BLOUNT, colored, 
testified on .behalf of the plaintiff as foiiows: 
I am plaintiff's step-father. When I got home from work 
the day he was injured, I found him in bed, pretty badly 
bruised all over and shaken up. He told me what had hap-
pened so I decided to go to see Mr. Friedman right a way to 
see what he had to say about it. I went to the market and 
Mr. Friedman told me he was going to send a doctor that 
night. I asked him why he ran into the boy and he told me 
that he was sorry. He said that he thought Jordan had a 
book on him which was very valuable because it showed how 
much a lot of his customers owed him, but that when he got 
back to the store after the collision he found the book on the 
cash register. I told him I didn't think that was much of a 
way to treat the boy, but he didn't say anything. The next 
day I went back to see him again because the doctor did not . 
come. He said he 'vonld send a doctor and not to worry that 
it was all right. The accident was on Thursday and the doc~ 
tor came Friday, Saturday and 1\tionday, to dress his legs 
and shoulder. The boy was in bed for two weeks and was 
hardly able to walk for some time after that. His legs had 
beeh cut and bruised badly. He kept complaining· of his 
shoulder and could not raise his right hand above his head. 
I have been working for !fr. Barron and his father in the 
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paper business for the last seventeen years. I took my boy 
to work with me one time a couple of months after he was 
hurt to see if he could help me, but his shoulder and arm were 
so bad that he could not lift anything heavy. He has not 
worked any since he was hurt. Mr. Friedman never did any-
thing for us and did not pay us the boy's wages 
page 14 ~ for the half week he worked for him before the col-
lision. William did not have any money on him 
when they brought him home from the hospital. 
DR. SOUTHGATE LEIGH, JR., 
testified on behalf of the plaintiff as follows: 
I have practiced medicine about five years. About a 'veek 
before the trial, I examined the plaintiff at the request of 
his counsel to enable me to testify as to the nature of the 
boy's injuries. He had no permanent injury, but had a 
definite sore spot on the top of his right shoulder which might 
prevent him from raising his arm up high or lifting heavy 
objects because of the pain. His legs just above the knees 
were badly scarred, but if the wheel of a Buick sedan had 
rolled over them it would probably, hut_ not always, break 
lhe bones, depending of course on their position. 
HENRY P. FRIEDMAN 
testified on his own behalf as follows : 
I run a grocery store called the Ne,vport Market at Thirty.:. 
fifth Street in Norfolk. Plaintiff had worked for me as a 
delivery boy for a week or hvo and used o11e of my bicycles 
for that purpose. On the morning of June 14th, 1934, the 
day on which plaintiff was injured, I we:Qt to the store about 
six-thirty or seven and stayed there until about seven-thirty. 
Upon my return around eight-thirty or nine o'clock, l was 
told that the plaintiff had quit work and had some change 
amounting to $1.25 belongi'l:lg to me, and also had a book 
showing the delivery of groceries to various customers, in-
cluding a ~Irs. Morschell, who bought merchan-
page 15 } dise on credit and receipted for in said book. The 
book was valuable to me booause it was the only 
record I had showing what was due me from the various cus-
tomers who signed therein for the merchandise they pur-
chased on credit. Later on that morning, I found out that 
plaintiff was working at a grocery store sever~l doors away 
from me. I sent my clerk, Mr. Sawyer, who sa1d he had seen 
·him at said store, to see if he could find Jordan to g~t the 
book, but he could not locate ·him. Mr. Sawyer is now in 
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North Carolina and hence I could not produce him at this 
trial. I thought that probably .Jordan might have left the 
book at the home of Mrs. ~iorschell, one of my customers to 
whom Jordan had delivered groceries that morning. On 
several prior occasions such books had been left with cus-
tomers by mistake so I decided to g·o to Mrs. Morschell 's house 
to see if the book was there. · In order to get to Mrs. Mar-
schell "s house, I had to drive northwardly along Newport 
Avenue and pass its intersection with Georgia Avenue. On 
my way there, I saw Jordan and Watford on Newport Ave-
nue standing on the sidewalk talking, each one with a bicycle 
and basket thereon. I drove up Newport A venue opposite 
plaintiff and Watford and stopped and asked plaintiff for 
the book. Because Ne,vport Avenue is a busy thoroughfare, 
I did not want to park there so I decided to go on and. turn 
into Georgia Avenue and park there and then find out. what 
plaintiff did with my book. I went ahead and as I made a 
dght-hand turn into Georgia. Avenue in second gear, plain-
tiff, who was then riding his bicycle along the sidewalk and 
had turned right on the sidewalk up Georgia A venue, ran 
off the sidewalk over the curb on to Georgia Avenue right 
in front of my car. As he came over the curb, his heavy bas-
ket load of groceries must have caused him to lose control 
and he fell right in front my car. I stopped as 
page 16 ~ quickly as I could but struck the pedal of the bicycle 
at a point not over four· or five feet from the in-
tersection of Newport and Georgia .... 1\. venues. No part of my 
.car ran over the plaintiff or the bicycle. He was lying un-
der the bicycle which 'vas hung- up under the bumper of my 
car. I sent my doctor to see plaintiff several times, not be-
cause I felt I was to blame for the accident but because he 
was injured as a result of the collision I had with him. I 
wanted to take plaintiff to the hospital in my own car, but 
some colored man would not. let me- do it and the latter took 
him before I could do so. 
HENRY P. FRIED~fAN. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
I did not fire plaintiff the morning he was hurt. I had 
not spoken to him that morning. I had not complained of the 
way he was using my bicycle and did not tell him I would pay 
him that night. I owed the boy about $2.50 for working part 
of that week and realized that I owed him more than he owed 
me. I did not ask him about any money. I did not see 
plaintiff until just before the accident and did not get on my 
bicycle and try to ride a.fter him when he came by my store. 
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I did not know what he had with him, but my sister-in-law 
who was helping me in the store at the time told me that 
Jordan had one of my receipt books and $1.25. I did not look 
at cash register before I went out. I did not try to chase 
the boy and thought I might find the bo·ok at Mrs. Morschell's 
· house. I happened to see him on my way there. I stopped 
my car on Newport Avenue right beside them. I . did not 
shout anything to him, but merely ask€d him for the book. I 
said nothing about the money. Before he answered :rile I 
started off in first gear and shifted to second and turned the 
corner because I wanted to park and talk to · the 
page 17 ~ boy. I did not take my car out of second gear 
and was not going more than ten or fifteen miles 
an hour. The boy was riding on the sidewalk and fell in 
front of me. I do not know why he tried to onto the street. 
I suppose he got excited or the groceries in the basket on 
his bicycle made him lose control and fall in front of me. The 
car did not pass over. the boy or the bicycle. They were· not 
under the running board of my car. They got hung up on 
my front bumper. I did not ask him to give me any money. 
I said nothing of the kind. I might have said something 
but I do not remember. I am not sure. I did not say that 
he only got what was coming to him. I did not hear Mr. 
Wilder or Mr. Jones. testify. I was ten or fifteen feet from 
them when they were testifying just now, but I don't re-
member it. I do not thi·nk they said that. I heard Mr. Mc-
Craw say the boy was riding in the street, but he was not. 
}fr. McCraw must have been mistaken. I did not start to 
back up. I did not put my hands in his pockets and have 
not gotten the $1.25. I did not find the book on him. I did 
try to help him up .. He 'vas not hurt bad,. only crying. It 
was just an aceident. It was my fault indirectly. I did not 
· mean to run into the boy. If I had not been there the ac-
cident would not have happened. I talked to plaintiff's coun-
sel on the phone three or four. weeks after the accident. I 
did not tell him I tried to trip the wheel with my car. I sent 
my doctor to see the boy several times. Jordan's stepfather 
came to see me but I did not tell him I had found the book on 
the cash register. I did not find it. The front of my car 
was in Georgia Avenue two or three feet from the corner 
of Newport Avenue. I had hardly turned into Georgia Ave-
- nue. I wanted to park there because there was so 
. page 18 } much traf-fic on Newport Avenue and I wanted to 
· ask the boy about the book. I did not want to have 
·a long· talk with him. There is a lot of traffic on Newport 
A venue but not so much on Georgia A venue. That is why 
I turned. 
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HENRY P. FRIEDMAN. 
RE-DIRE.CT EXA¥INATION. 
What I meant by the statement that I believed it was my 
fault indirectly was that if I had not been at the place where 
the accident happened, the plaintiff would no have been hurt .. 
SADYE GALUMBECI{ 
testified on behalf of the defendant as follows: 
I am 18 years old and defendant married my sister. I go 
to Maury High .School. On the morning of the day of the 
collision, I helped Mr. Friedman in his store because his 
wife was sick. While defendant was absent, Jordan came 
back from delivering orders, was saucy, left the store and 
did not return. He did not pay me any money which he 
had collected or give me Mr. Friedman's book. I told Mr .. 
Friedman what had happened. He sent Mr. Sawyer to Mr .. 
Kl~vans' to see if he could get the book, but Mr Sawyer did 




Mr. Friedman came to the store around seven o'clock that 
morning, sent the boy out on some deliveries and left at 
seven-thirty. He came back about eight forty-five. I· do not 
know whether he said anythin15 to Jordan that morning. I 
was in and out of the store all of the time. Mr. Friedman 
came back to the store about eight-thirty that morning. I 
think it was around nine when Jordan left. I do not know 
why the boy left .. 
page 19 r DR. -R. D. GLASSER 
testified on behalf of the defendant as follows: 
I have practiced inedicne in Norfolk for nearly twenty-
'·three years. At Mr. Friedman's request, I treated Jordan 
· for his injuries. I visited him three times and did not feel 
that his condition called for any further treatment. He sus-
tained no permanent injuries, but was cut and bruised about 
the legs, shoulder and body a good deal It is perfectly pos-
sible for the wheels of an automobile to run over a person's 
legs above the knees without breaking the bones. Mr. Fried-
man paid me for treating the boy .. 
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Note: Plaintiff was stripped to the waist and examined by 
Dr. Glasser during the trial. He stated that he could find 
nothing wrong with him, but plaintiff winced and showed ap-
parent soreness when touched on the top of the right 
shoulder. 
DR. R. D. GLASSER. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
There is a small round bump on plaintiff's right shoulder, 
but I do not think it is sore. It was probably caused by a 
severe blow. 
A true copy. 
Teste : This 12th day of March, 1935 . 
• JAl\1:ES U. GOODE, (Se~l) 
Acting Judge of said Court. 
page 20 ~ CERTIFICATE OF EXCEPTION NO. 2. 
This is to certify that the following instructions were the 
only instructions granted at the trial of this case: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 1. 
"The Court instructs the jury that the burden is on the 
plaintiff to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 
the defendant was neg·ligent, and that he, the plaintiff, was 
injured as a direct result of such negligence.'' 
INSTRlTCTION NO. 3. 
"The Court instructs the jury that if you believe, from 
the evidence, that the defendant was op~rating his automo-
bile along Newport A venue and was making a right-hand 
turn into Georgia A venue, and that the plaintiff negligently 
ran or fell in front of the defendant's automobile and was 
injured, then you must find for the defendant.'' 
INSTRUCTION NO. 2. 
"The Court instructs the jury that if they find for the 
plaintiff, they· may consider in fixing the damages to which 
he is entitled his physical injury and suffering, and if they 
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also believe, from the evidence, that plaintiff's injury resulted 
from wilfulness or maliciousness on the part of the defendant, 
they may award the plaintiff in addition to the damages 
above mentioned such further sums as will, in their opinion, 
constitute proper punishment and proper warning against 
the commission of such wrongs.'' 
Teste: This 12th day of March, 1935. 
JiliES U. GOODE, (Seal) 
Acting Judge of said Court. 
page 21 ~ CERTIFICATE OF EXCEPTION NO. 3. 
This is to certify that the following instruction was given 
at the request of the plaintiff over the objection of the de-
fendant: 
"The Court instructs the jury that if they find for the 
plaintiff, they must consider in fixing the damages to which 
he is entitled his physical injury and suffering, and if they 
also believe, from the evidence that plaintiff's injury resulted 
from wilfulness or maliciousness on the part of the defend-
ant, they may award the plaintiff in addition to the damages 
above mentioned such furthqr sums as will, in their opinion, 
constitute proper punishment and proper warning against 
the colllll':lission of such wrongs. '' 
The defendant objected .to the granting of the afore-
mentioned instruction on the ground that there was no evi-
dence that the defendant wilfully and maliciously injured 
the plaintiff, and hence there was no evidence to support the 
granting of this instruction; tha.t there was no allegation of 
any maliciousness on the part of the defendant in the notice 
of motion· for judgnient, and that there was no evidence be-
fore the jury upon which they could form an opinion as to 
what sum would constitute proper punishment to the de-
fendant. But the Court overruled the objection to the grant-
ing of said instruction, to which action of the Court in over-
ruling said objection the defendant duly excepted. 
Teste : This 12th day of March, 1935. 
JAMES U. GOODE, (Seal} 
Acting_ Judge of s_aid Court. . 
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page 22 ~ CERTIFICATE .OF EXCEPTION NO ... 4 .. 
·This is to certify that the following instruction was of.;. 
fered by .the defendant, whi-ch the Court refused to grant: 
' 
''The Court instructs the . jury that . the fact that the de-
fendant sent his doctor to treat the plaintiff and paid the doc-
tor's bill is not to be considered on the question of liability.'' 
This instruction should have been granted for the reason 
that the jury may have gotten the idea that the defendant 
must have acknowledged liability by sending his doctor to 
treat the plaintiff. The jury should have been told that such 
action of itself on the part of the defendant was immaterial 
on the question of liability. 
Teste: This 12th day of March, 1935. 
JAMES U .. GOODE, (.Seal) 
Acting Judge of said ·Court. 
CERTIFICATE OF EXCEPTION NO. 5. 
This is to certify that after the evidence was in, and the 
Instructions mentioned in •Oerti:ficate of E.xception No. 2 had 
been given, the jury, having heard the argument of counsel, 
returned a verdict in the words as follows: 
"We, the Jury, find.for the plaintiff in the sum of $1,500.00, 
believing it was the result wilful and malicious ~eglig,ence. 
W. B. ·Hastings, Foreman.'' · 
Whereupon, the defendant moved the Court to set ·aside 
the verdict and grant him a new trial on the following 
grounds: 
page 23} 1. That the verdict 'vas contr~cy to the law and 
the evidence. 
2. That the verdict was excessive. 
3. That the -Court granted an improper instruction for the 
plaintiff over the objection of the defenda~~ · . 
The ·Court continued the argument of said motion to J anu-
ary 26th, 1935. On· said last mentioned date, the defendant 
asserted an additional ground for setting aside the verdict 
of the jury and granting_ him a new trial, to-w:it: after-dis::-
covered evidence, and· filed the affidavit of one Bernard 
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Baker, and the defendant's own affidavit showing that the 
after-discovered evidence was material in its object and was 
such as on another trial ought to produce different results 
on the merits; that it was not cu,mulative, corroborative or 
collateral; that the defendant could not have discovered said 
evidence before the trial by the use of due diligence, and 
that said after-discovered evidence could be produced at an-
other trial. But the Court overruled .said motion and entered 
judgment against the defendant in accordance with the ver-
dict of the jury, to which action of the Court in so overruling 
'the defendant's motion to set aside the verdict and grant 
him a new trial, the defendant duly excepted. 
Teste : This 12th day of March, 1935 .. 
JAMES U. GOODE, (Seal) 
Acting Judge of said Court. 
The affidavits referred to above are under separate cover 
and have been duly authenticated by the trial Judge. 
page 24 ~ CERTIFICATE OF EX!CEPTION NO. 6. 
This is to certify that the original notice of motion for 
judgment filed in this action read as follows : 
''Virginia : 
In the. Court of Law and Chancery of the City of Norfolk .. 
William Jordan, an imant, by Richard S .. Barron, his next 
friend, Plaintiff, 
'IJ. 
Henry P. Friedman, Defendant. 
NOTICE OF MOTION FOR JUDGMENT. 
To: Henry P. Friedman, 
TAI{E NOTICE that on Friday the 20th, day of July, 
1934, at 10 :00 A. M. or as soon thereafter as he can be heard, 
William Jordan, an infant under the age of 21 years, who 
sues by Richard S. Barron, his next friend, will move the 
Court of Law and Chancery of the City of Norfolk, Vir-
ginia, at i~s Court room in said City1 for a judgment in his favor against you for $1,500.00. Said sum has become due 
by you to him as damages for injuries caused him by yon 
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at the following time and place and under the following cir-
cumstances : 
On June 14, 1934, the said William Jordan was standing 
on Newport Avenue, in the City of Norfolk, near its inter-
section with Georgia A venue with a bicycle which he had 
been using and intended to use near at hand. He then and 
there perceived you, in an automobile driven by 
page 25 ~ you, proceeding Northwardly along said Newport 
Avenue towards him. He then had reason to be-
lieve and did believe you were pursuing him in an attempt 
to take from him a sum of money, to-wit: $1.25 which you 
claimed . he owed you and he denied owing you. He there-
upon got upon his bicycle and rode Northwardly along New-
port Avenue, and turned to the right into Georgia A venue at 
the intersection of said Avenues. You then increased the 
speed of your automobile and also turned to the right into 
Georgia A venue in pursuit of said William Jordan and, in 
an effort to stop him and take said sum of money from him, 
you· then a~d there negligently, wrongfuly, wilfully and de-
liberately ran your automobile into, upon, against, and over 
him with great force and violence, throwing him to the 
ground and causing him severe mental shock and great physi-
cal injury in a·nd about the head, arms, legs and other parts 
of the body. As a result he has been caused great suffering 
and much loss of time which he would have otherwise spent 
in the pursuit of a lawful and gainful occupation, and hl:u; 
been put to much trouble and expense in attempting to be 
cured of said injuries. Demand has been made upon you 
for the damages aforesaid and payment has been neglected 
and declined. By reason of the premises the undersigned 
is entitled to have and recover of and from you the said 
sum of $1,500.00 and all costs in this behalf expended. 
WILLIAM JORDAN, . 
By Richard S. Barron, his next friend. 
By BAIRD, W,HITE AND LANNING, 
· His Attorneys .. 
On the morning of the trial of said case and. before the 
commencement of said trial, counsel for the plain-
page 26 ~ tiff asked leave to amend said notice of motion 
for judgment, which le~ve was granted by the 
Court and the amendment was made at the bar of the Court 
by counsel for the plaintiff merely scratching out divers 
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words and phrases so as to make said amended notice of 
motion for judgment, on which this action was tried, read 
as follows: 
''Virginia : 
In the Court of Law and Chancery of the City of Norfolk. 
William Jordan, an infant by Richard S. Barron, his next 
friend, Plaintiff, 
v. 
Henry P. Friedman, Defendant. 
NOTICE OF MOTION FOR JUDGMENT. 
To Henry P. Friedman. 
TAKE NOTICE that on Friday the 20th day of July, 
1934, at 10 :00 A. M. or a.s soon thereafter as he can be heard, 
William Jordan, an infant, under the age of 21 years, who 
sues by Richard S. Barron his next friend,· will move the 
Court of Law and -Chancery of the City of Norfolk, Virginia, 
at its Court Room in said City, for a judgment in his favor 
against you for $1,500.00. Said sum has become due by yon 
to, him as damages for injuries caused him by you at the 
-following time and place and under the following circum-
stances: 
On June 14, 1934, the said William Jordan was riding a 
bicycle on Newport A venue, in the City of Norfolk, near its 
· intersection with Georgia A venue. He then and there per-
ceived you, in an automobile driven by you, pro-
page 27 }- ceedinp; Northwardly along said Newport A venue 
towards him. He then had reason to believe and 
did believe you were pursuing him in an attempt to take 
from him a sum of money, to-wit, $1.25, which you claimed 
he owed you and he denied owing you. He thereupon rode 
Northwardly along Newport A venue, and turned to the right 
into Georgia Avenue at the intersection of said A venues. You 
then increased the speed of your automobile a,nd also turned 
to the right into Georgia A venue in pursuit of said William 
Jordan, and, in an effort to stop him and take said sum of 
money from him, you then and there negligently, wrongfully, 
wilfully and deliberately ran your automobile into, upon, 
against and over him with great force and violence, throw-
ing him to the ground, and causing him severe mental shock 
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and great physical injury in and about the head, arms, legs 
and other parts of the body. As a result he has been caused 
great suffering and much loss of time which he would have 
otherwise spent in the pursuit of a lawful and gainful occu-
pation, and has been put to much trouble and expense in 
attempting to be cured of said injuries. 
Demand has been made upon you for the damages afore-
said and payment has been neglected and declined. 
By reason of the premiss the undersigned is entitled to 
have and recover of and from you the said sum of $1,500.00 
and all costs in this behalf expended. 
WILLIAM JORDAN, 
By RichardS. Barron, his next friend. 
By BAIRD, WHITE AND LANNING, 
His Attorneys. 
Teste : This 12th day of March, 1935. 
page 28 } Virginia: 
JAMES U. GOODE, (Seal) 
Acting Judge of said Court. 
In the Clerk's Office of the Court of Law and Chancery 
of the City of Norfolk. 
I, W. L. Prieur, J r :, Clerk of the Court of Law and Chan-
cery of the ·City of Norfolk, do hereby certify that the fore-
going and annexed is a true transcript of the record in the 
-suit of William Jordan, an infant, etc., Plaintiff, v. Henry 
P. Friedman, defendant, late pending in said Court. 
I further certify that the said copy was not made up and 
completed until the plaintiff had had due notice of the mak-
ing of the same and the intention of the defendant to take 
an appeal therein. 
Given under my hand this 14th day of March, 1935. 
W. L. PRIEUR, JR., Clerk. · 
Fee for this record, $17.50. 
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Virginia: 
In the .Court of Law and Chancery of the City of Norfolk. 
William Jordan, an infant, by Richard S. Barron, his next 
friend1 Plaintiff, aga~nst 
Hen~.P. F'riedman, Defendant. 
I, James U. Goode, Judge of the Corporation Court of 
the City of Norfolk, Number Two, sitting at the -request of 
the Judge of this Court do hereby certify that the affidavits 
of Bernard Baker and Henry P. Friedman, are the original 
affidavits filed in this -Court, in support of the defendant "s 
motion for a new trial, and referred to in certificate of ex-
ception N amber five on page 23 of the transcript of the record 
in the said case, and that I do authenticate the same pur-
suant to Rule XXIV of the Supreme ·Court of Appeals of 
Virginia, the said affidavits being attached hereto .. 
Teste: This 12th day of March, 1935. 
JA~£ES U. GOOD·E, 
Judge of the ·Corporation Court of the City of 
Norfolk, Number Two, sitting at the request 
of the Judge of the Court of Law and Chan-
cery of the City of Norfolk. 
State of Virginia, 
City of Norfolk, to-wit: 
This day personally appeared before me, Blanche V. Sad-
ler, a Notary Public for the City aforesaid, in the State of 
Virginia, Bernard Baker, in my City aforesaid, who being· 
first duly sworn according to law, made oath and stated that 
he resides at 4314 Colley Avenue, Norfolk, Virginia, and is 
engaged in the trucking business in said :City; that he knows 
William Jordan, who was the plaintiff in the action of Wil-
liam Jordan, etc., v. ,Henry P. Friedman, pending in the Court 
of·Law and Chancery of' the City of Norfolk, Virginia; that 
sometime in September, 1934, the said William Jordan was 
employed by him to assist him in marketing vegetables, and 
that he worked for him for approximately five weeks, during 
which time he was well able to work and rode a bicycle on 
se\7'eral occasions; that he is not re]ated to either of· the par-
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ties in the aforementioned action, and that he has no interest 
therein whatsoever. 
B.ERNARD BAKER. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 11th day of Janu-
ary, 1935. My commission expires July 25th, 1936. 
Filed Jan. 26th, 1935. 
J. U. G. 
Virginia: 
BLAN·CHE V. SADLER, 
Notary Public. 
In the Court of Law and CJ.:tancery of the City of Norfolk. 
William Jordan, an infant, by Richard S. Barron, his next 
friend, Plaintiff, 
"· Henry P. Friedman, Defendant. 
State of Virginia, 
City of Norfolk, to-wit: 
This day personally appeared before me, Blanche V. Sad-
ler, a Notary Public for the City aforesaid, in the State of 
Virginia, Henry P. Friedman, in my City aforesaid, who be-
ing first duly sworn according to law, made oath and stated 
that he is the defendant in the above entitled action; that at 
the trial of the aforementioned action, the plaintiff testified 
that as a result of the injuries received by him, he was not 
able to work, and did not work, for anyone from the time 
he received said injuries up to the time of trial ; that said 
evidence was very material in determining the plaintiff's con-
dition as a result of said injuries; that sometime after the 
aforementioned case 'vas tried, deponent ascertained, for the 
first time, that sometime in the month of September, 1934, the 
said plaintiff was employed for approximately six weeks by 
one Bernard Baker, said period of employment benig in-
cluded within the time the plaintiff testified he did not work 
and could not work by reason of said injuries. Deponent 
further says that said after-discovered evidence is material 
in its object and is such as on another trial oug·ht to pro-
duce different results on the merits; that said evidence is 
,. 
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not cumulative, corroborative or collateral; that deponent 
could not ha:ve discovered said evidence before the trial by 
the use of due diligence, and that said after-discovered evi-
dence can be produced at another trial. 
HENRY P. FRIEDMAN. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 16th day of Janu-
ary, 1935. My commission expires July 25th, 1936. 
Filed Jan. 26th, 1935. 
J. U. G. 
BLANCHE V. SADLER, 
Notary Public. 
A Copy-Teste: 
M. B. WATTS, C. 0. 
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